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1 INTRODUCTION 
Being asked Lo speak to a group of labour lawyers on the common Jaw is 
akin to being invited to sample the delights of a hornets' nest. For many 
labour lawyers any reference to the common law seems to conjure up 
nightmares of a retreat to legal formalism and an abandonment of fair~ 
ness as the keystone for resolving the disputes that inevitably arise in the 
course of the relationship between employer and employee and between 
trade unions and employers. In fact for some, I suspect that what they 
would welcome hearing from me today is a rapid obituary for the com-
mon law insofar as labour law is concerned. 
In one sense this jaundiced view of the common Jaw is nOL surprising 
The common law in the form of the Jaw of comract postulates the creation 
of formal legal relationships by freely negotiated agreements and in 
arriving at any agreement the relative bargaining strength of the parties is 
a crucial determinant of the outcome of the process. When it comes to the 
negotiation of employment contracts in a country with vast reserves of 
relatively unskilled workers desperate for jobs, the imbalances of bargain-
ing power all favour the side of the employer. A legal system that sought 
to govern employmem relationships solely by means of the outcome of 
the process of formation of the employment contract would inevitably fail 
to strike an acceptable balance between the competing interests of work-
ers and employers that lie at the heart of the relationship as well as the in-
terests of the wider public in a viable economy. 
Typical of the flaws that exist in a purely contractual analysis of employ-
ment was the view espoused in a number of cases prior to, and indeed 
during, the developing stages of our current jurisprudence, that partici-
pation in a strike entitled the employer as a maHer of right to terminate 
the contract of employment. The law of contract does not provide an 
adequate vehicle for ensuring fairness in dismissal. Certain matters (hat 
we regard as basic to all employment such as annual leave and sick leave 
and limitations on hours of work in {he imerests of [he health of workers, 
and the establishment of a basic floor of fair employment conditions, are 
simply not achievable by an individualised process of forming employment 
R vSmit 1955 (l) SA 239 (C). whilsr rlltre ilre persuasive argllnrenrs [hill [his approach 
was incorrecr (sce Wallis l.abOl1r lind Fmploympnt Law, para 4H) it was lhe prevailing 
view ar [tic rime, and in any evenl a rLJrely comractlJal analysis lTlust in [tit eTid result 
in a right to terminate ttlC contracts of rtll' striking workers. 
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contracts, There are also difficulties in, shaping appropnate rules for col-
lective actlon such as stnkes, plcketmg- or boycotts WIthin the framework 
of the common law of delict. To suggest that the common law alone 
should govern labour relations is manifestly an untenable proposition, 
What is intriguing, bearing in mind the a[(acks levelled at this proposition, 
IS that it is difficult to find anyone who espouses it. It is always easier to 
knock down a skittle that no-one else has bothered to erect, 
Does that, however, mean that the common law has no role to play in 
the field of labour law' Judging by some of the colourful expressions used 
(0 describe its role that one encounters in academic writing one might 
Judge that it should be entirely excluded, Sir 0[(0 Kahn-Freund described 
the contract of employment as 'a command disguised as an agreemenr'~ 
and referred to the contract of employment as 'that indispensable figment 
of the legal mind',' Lord Wedderburn's criticism of the role of the com-
mon law in employment is scathing and his references to the 'mentality 
of the common law' are undoubtedly pejorative," Recently, in an address 
in this country, a distinguished academIC spoke of 'the undermining in~ 
fluences of the common law',' South African lawyers were quick to adopt 
the same theme" with a certain disregard for the fundamental differences 
between the different origins 01 English and South African law on employ-
ment: They seem to have paid Ii [(Ie regard to the position in Europe 
2 Deneys Reilz v South African Commercial Catering and Allred Worker", 'Unum J 991 (2) SA 
685 (WI 
3 Murdoch v Bullough [923 TPD 495. 
4 ImfOduCliof) 10 Renner K The ins/itutiuns of pnvl.1fp. law and tht'ir social Junctions (1949) 
28 
5 Davies P and Freedland M (eds) Labour and the Law 3 ed (J (84) 18 
(, Lord Wedderburn The worker and (he (uw 1cd (1986) 1, The full Oavour of his hostility 10 
[he common law can only be captured by reading the entire book. Elsewhere (Employ-
ment rights in Britain and curope. (1991) 19) lIe wrOle of 'This abililY of the common 
law to engender new threcHS to Ihe legality of" trade union anivilies which lie like land-
mines ufl(il a plainliff' activates them and in the interim creale uncenainty. ' 
7 Professor Sir Bob Hepple QC 'Can collective labour l<lw Iransplarns work? The Soulh 
Afric<ln example' (1999) 20 Il) 1 at 2. 
B See, for example, Rycroft A and jonlaan 1\ in A guide LO South African lavour law J ed 
(1990) Chap I where [he contraCl model is compared with a 'property' model and a 
'sratus' model. The difficulry is [har rhe practical application of lhese allernative models 
to ltle employment situation and Iheir capaCity [0 provide answers (0 rhe real quesrions 
lhar arise in lhe course of dispules be!.wet~n employees and Irade unions on tlw one 
hand and employers on the Olher is not speJled out. (Professor jordaan's views appear 
to have changed by the lime rhc second edirion was published in 1992 particularly in 
regard to lhe notion of lhe employmenl relalionship as one of stalus, See 29 -12.) One 
finds similar crirical overtones in Davis. 'Refusing to slray beyond lhe confines of con-
tract: The jurisprudence of Adv Erasmus SC (1985) (,11./425. Professor Davis. as he 
rhen was, quoles (ar 429) Wilh approval a reference by j()hn Brand lO 'bondage to the 
common law'. See also Prokssor Davis' article 'The juridHicarion of indusrrial relarions 
in Soulh Africa or Mike Tyson v Johannes VOti' (1991) 1211) 1 IBI. It is not 110wever 
clear from the article wily tile comparison between a pugilisr and a jurist was lhoughr ro 
be appropriare as neither is lhereafter referred to 
lJ For example thar South African law, going back ro its Roman law origins. has always 
[reared employmenr as contractual ill nalure whjlsl tllis is a relatively recent view in 
England adop!ed during the Victorian era as employmem moved away from liS feudal 
[continued on next page} 
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where it appears that there is less debate over this issue because of the 
acceptance of the regulated contract and the existence of codes of labour 
Jaw and constitutionally entrenched labour rights.'o 
Whilst accepting the force of some of this body of crilicism and its use~ 
fulness in describing the social and economic realities of employment, 
from a legal perspective it is essentially a criticism, based on the results in 
particular cases, of what is perceived to be a 'common law' approach. Irs 
weakness as a tool in practice is illustrated by a note on a deCision of the 
old Labour Appeal Court. The author says the decision 'provides a good 
illustration of just how destructive a common-law oriented approach to in-
dustrial relations can be'." This comment arose from the interpretation 
given by the court 1O the definition of 'employee' in the old LRA that ex-
cluded people who had been dismissed, but were the potential benefici-
aries of an agreement between the employer and the trade union for 
them to be 'called back' if the employer decided to employ additional 
workers. The problem is that on an application of the self-same common 
law principles the then Appellate Division had no difficulty in overturning 
the judgement and giving a far broader interpretation to the word 'em-
ployee'." In turn it was following a judgment given some 60 years before. 
What is one 1O make of this from the perspective of the influence of the 
common law on the law of employment? It surely cannot be suggested 
that the judges in the appeal court were not common lawyers steeped in 
the common law and the patterns of thought that it engenders." The rules 
they applied in interpreting the legislation were common law rules not 
unique to labour ma(fers. Why is (he one to be cacegorised as flowing 
from an adherence 1O an 'antediluvian commitment to the common law""' 
background ilnd the view of service as a stalus rela(ionship to be enforced by criminal 
sarl("tion. Professor JOf(l<'lan has highlighted some of these i..,..,Ut~.., in hi:; contribution un 
employment law in Zimmerman R and Visser n (~ds) Southern cross." r:ivillaw and Com-
mon law in South ,Vric(l 389 415. The early flirtation wieh lhe English rule [har lhere 
could bc no order for ~p{!cific performcirlce of d contraCl of employment was disposed 
ot by [he judgment in Na(ionai I Inion of Texrill' Workl'rs v swg Packin9.~ (ply) Ud 1982 
(4) SA I ~I en by an appeal 10 common law principJf:"s. 
I 0 In Europe the contract of employrnent or employment relationship CIS defined by 
national law is the foundation ot employment rights. Blanpain R F.urupean /afmur law 8 
eli (2U02) 301-31~. In Catherine Barnard·s book EC l:"mploymenr Law 2 ed (2000) the 
cornracI of crnploylllt!nl scarcely warr,Hlts a merltion dllhougll there IS a directive. Di-
rective q J 1533/EEC, on fJroof at lhe conrran ot employment. 
1 I Tlw case was Borg- Warner .SA (pry) /.td v N(llional Awomobile and Allied Workers' Umon 
(now known as National Metalworkers UnIOn oj South Africa) (199 I) 12 IL] ~)49 (LAC). The 
note is lordaan, ·Selenive re-employment revisited' (1991) 12 IL] I 192. 
12 Nariona·' Automobile and Alffed W()rker<~' Union (now known as Nariona{ Umon oj Me/a/-
workers oJSA) v Borg-Warner SA (Ply) Ltd 19(}4 (3) SA I ~ (A). 
1'5 The judges were J(Jubert JA, Nestadt JA and van den Ileever JA who gave (Ile judgmcnt 
of" lhe court. The fact (hat i( was only a three judge court suggests Ihat the issues were 
no( regarded as parlinllarly complex 
14 The expression is Ihal of Professor Davts (supra n 8. J 189). Aga.in. lhe judgment he was 
criticising for I(S common law OVertones was overturned on <'Ippcal by a group of com-
mon law judges who dtd not regard ft:lirness as a queslion of law! See Media Workers 
Assocwtion oj SA and others v The Press Corporal1on qf SA Uti (1992) 13 IIJ 139 I (A). 
When thc mattcr re(Urned to the LAC Ihe deCision by (he Industrial ("oun was uptleJd 
[continued on next page] 
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and the other passes without comment? If the fault truly lies with the com-
mon law then surely the least we can expect of it is that it should not pro-
vide a moving target for our criticism, sometimes oppressing the worker 
and sometimes not?:5 
This is not the place to explore this field in depth but may I suggest that 
part of the problem lies with expecting too much of general common law 
constructs in the field of labour law. Firstly. let us understand that when 
Lord Wedderburn writes of the common law he is writing of English com-
mon law which in many respects is very different from our civil law sys-
tem derived from the Roman Dutch heritage of South African law. Thus. it 
is far easier in South Africa to recognise and give effect to the results of 
collective bargaining because unlike England we recognise a contract for 
the benefit of a third party and are not bound by a strict doctrine of con-
tractual privity. I;' It is accordingly unnecessary for collective agreements 
between trade unions and employers to be regarded as 'gentlemen's 
agreements' not binding in law.17 That in [urn makes it easier for the re-
sults of collective bargaining to be incorporated into the workers' con-
tracts of employment. In many instances that has been a substantial 
weapon on the side of trade unions seeking to resist changes to working 
conditions such as shift patterns because they can claim that this involves 
a change in the terms of the workers' contracts of employment which 
cannot be effected unilaterally. 
Secondly. it is important to recognise that general legal constructs such 
as the law of contract or the law of delict, particularly in a civilian legal 
although the judge did [101 change his view See (1993) ! 4 IL) 93H (LAC). II IS suggested 
,hal the aHitude that Pro lessor Davis was rightly criricising was not so rnuch an ad-
herence [0 common law bur a narrow-minded altitude to the role of indus(rial anion In 
labour disputes. Ttlat says something about lhe judge bul lillie about the common law. 
15 II is this itSpeCl 01 a moving target thar suggesrs that the common law is more a mixed 
blessing than the sole villain of the piece. Lord Wedderburn seems dismissive of lhe 
employer's obligalion of good failh (The Worker and the Law. supra n (I, 180 et seq) ilw it 
is on this I"oundation in conjunction With the common Jaw concept of repudiation of 
contracts lhat the notion of conslructive dismissal has been huill. The implied term has 
heen of henefit to workers in the context or their pension rights; Imperial Group Pension 
Trllsl Ud v Imperial Tobacco Ud and others /19911 2 All ER 597 (CIl D): and in the recent 
recognilion of a right not 10 have one's repulc:llion in the market place injured by the 
employer's misconduct. Malik v Bank oj Credit and Cummerce International SA (in liqui-
dation) /1997] 3 All ER 1 (HL). 
16 Taking an example from a different neld of law the result or this difference is thitt a 
South African coun had no difficulty in giVing effect to a Ilimalaya clause in a bill of 
lading, San tam Insurance Co Ltd v SA Stevedores Ltd 1989 (1) SA I S2 (0). One can com-
pare lhis with Itle difficulties expertenced in England in ohtaining recognition and ac-
ceptance ot" the same clause. Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ud 11962J I All ER 1 (HL) 
and New Zealand Shippmg Co Ltd v A .'vt Satterthwaite and Co Ltd 11971] I All ER 1015 
(PC) 
17 Lord Wedderburn, The Worker and the La.w. supra n 6. 118-122 and Ford Motor Com-
pany v AUEF and TGWU [196<)1 2 All ER 4tH. Whilst Booysen J in Consolidated Frame 
Collon CorporatIOn Ltd v .. Hinister oj .. Hanpower 1985 (I) SA 191 (I) referred lO (hese 
authorities arid said lhat he saw riO reason why they should not apply in SOlJlb Africa, 
he gave no reason I"or (bat view and there are many cases subsequently when such 
agreemenls have been enforced by tile courts. See also Wallis. supra n I, para 13. 
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system that is based on broad principles rather than a case by case devel-
opment 01 the law as in England, will rarely be capable of responding to 
all situations that fall within their general purview in a way that is univer-
sally satisfactory.18 Civilian systems, which are now largely codified, recog-
nise the concept of a regulated contract where the contract is established 
by a blend of negotiation between the parties and imperative standards 
usually having their source in legislative measures. There is no reason why 
South African lawyers cannot recognise and accept the same approach. 
However as Kahn-Freund pointed out some years agol" this approach has 
I R The point IS made by Marais J (as he then was) in Marrin v Murray (I (95) 16 {1:/ 589 (C) 
at 600 in coloud'ul language that matches thai of (Ile protagonists on (he other side of 
the fence 'The common law does nOI swing abow lJI.(e a wearflcrvanc jn whatever 
dircctiorl any [kIssing gust of wind may blow. It is not designed to be, and is inherently 
incapatJlt' of being, responsive ro volcuilc social awl economic cirClimstann:s or a kind 
which rrequemly reverse themselves during relatively shon periods of lime . The ebb 
and flow of demand and supply in rhe field of employment, the waxing and waning of 
respective bargaining strengr.hs, and the impact which extraneous circumstances 
(cl.n Ilave upon the respective pOSitions of employer and empluyee, are all factors to 
whicll thc cornman law cannot reasonC:!tJly be expected to respund as Liley occur. It 
would require so freqllcrlt and kaleidoscopic a shifting of obligations (hat (here would 
be no u:rrainty or stability in [he cornman law It is of course so that the common 
law should not be regarded as an ossified code of immutable principles which only [ile 
legislature can alter. but there is virtue in slability and predictability in tile law. and it is 
a virtue tha[ should not he lHldervalued·. 
19 In a note entitled 'A note on status and ,on{mc{ in Rrilish lafmur jaw' (1967) 30 MLR 63~ 
It is worth <llloting some of what he said: 'Tlw labollr law of CWell Britairl shares with 
IhaL or the other nations Jr1 our orbir of Civilisation two essential jurisprudential t"f'atures: 
It is based 01\ the COlllractual fOllndation of the obligatiun ro work and of tllf' obligation 
to pay wilge<;, and it is (II till: sall\e tlllle perrw:atcd by a Lt:ndency (Q forll\ulatl: an ever-
growing number of imperative norms for the protection of tile worker. norms which the 
p(lrries to the contract cannot validly set aside to tile detrimeru of tile economically 
weaker parry. This dual insistence on dgreemcnr as the legal basis of at least some of 
rhe essential rights (lnd ollllg(ltions and on mandarory regulilLion as the source of the 
mlllent 01 Lhe relationship has given rise (Q a jurisprudential dilemma whicllrlas so far 
not been clearly fdeed in (he litera Lure on tile subject 
How can we expl<lin tile c:onceptual confusion between two legal phenomena as 
ditferent as Ihe irnposition of rights ami duties irrespective of the voliliO[l of the pnson 
concerned and the shaping of a legill rclillio[l irlto which he has freely entered. Why, 
then do English lawyers see a reversion to "'staUiS" in rules which leave the parties free 
(0 contract or not ro contract, bur ((:srricr their freedom to contract except on certain 
minimum terms? 
The reason must be found in d gap in the conceptual cfjuipml:nr of English l(:Iw which 
itself reflects the social and jurtsprudclHial principles of its growLh. The distinction be~ 
LWeenjUs cogens and jus disposJtivum. between ·imperative· and ·op[ional' norrns of the 
law of contract. is farnili(:lr to every practising lawyer in any Continenrallegal system. It 
fits naturally into the thinking of lawyers brought lip and working in (:I world of legal 
Ihought in which tht~ systematic regulation of the law at" contract through general norms 
apphcable to all contracts and special norrns applicaille to denrled types has for almost 
twO centuries been cornrnonplace. The distinction is not commonly used in English 
legal praClice . The reason (:Ippears [0 Ile tllat the positive regulation of the substance 
of the cOnfraClual relationship has only wirhin fairly recent limes become one of tile 
recognised furluions of lhe legIslature. The law of contract was devtloped by lhe courts, 
and the principal conceptual instrurnents which they handh:d were (lie intention of the 
parries (which to a large eX[(:nt fulfilled and still fulfils the function or the jus disposiri-
vum on (he Concinent) and public policy whidl, in il few exlrerne cases. may desuoy a 
contract, but whICh cannot mould it Thus the IdeC:! of tile positive regulation by law of 
the content of uJlllraLLual relations is. as English legal hislory goes, fairly new' 
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not hitherto commended itself to English common lawyers who tend to 
regard the contract and the legislation as two separate sources of author-
ity in competition with one anO(her. 
Thirdly, once it is recognised that common law concepts are capable of 
accommodating collective agreements but will not alone suffice to resolve 
all issues of labour law in an acceptable fashion, it is possible to move 
from an 'either/or' approach that places the common law and particularly 
the law of contract in permanent conflict with other sources of law, such 
as collective agreements and legislation, to a 'both/and' analysis that rec-
ognises that in this field no single source will enjoy primacy. That will tend 
to make the search for the applicable rule in any particular situation com-
plex but the overall system will give greater recognition to the competing 
imerests of the participants and the ongoing need to strike a balance be-
tween them in the greater interests of society as a whole. Where the bal-
ance is struck will always be a maner of contestation in any democratic 
state and will fluctuate over time with changes in government. This is the 
very type of contest that is at present underway in South Africa with the 
promised review by government of labour laws with a view to simplifying 
their impact on small and medium-sized business. As with most forms of 
political debate both sides state their case in extreme terms. For employ-
ers it is a matter of removing 'the dead hand of bureaucracy' and freeing 
up enterprise that 'provides jobs and keeps the economy running'. For the 
trade unions it is a matter of 'defending rights won in a lengthy struggle'. 
The language on both sides is the language of 'either/or'" but the result is 
always a compromise between the two_ An analysis of labour law that 
views it solely rrom one or other perspective presents an inadequate pic· 
ture of the task that confronts the labour lawyer. whelher in practice in 
advising and representing clients, or in the reality of the workplace and 
the negotiating forum or in advancing the process of law reform. 
20 rhis way of framing fhe debate in terms of stark conlraStS is appealing at least in help-
ing to identify the Issues in delJa(e. For example, (oUins II Employment Luw (2003, 
Clarendon Press) 21 (drawing upon his article 'Lubour Luw us a Vocatwn' (1989) 105 
LQR 168) wri(es of the 'unceasing struggle between (hese two paradigms' which he de-
scribes as 'a liberal framework emphasisringl (he imponance of efFicient and compet-
itive business· and an 'induslfial pluralist framework emphasisflng] for reasons of fair-
ness and respec( For the dignity of worKers the imparlance of inslitutional arrangements 
that achieve joirH regula(ion of the workplace or indus(rial sector'. lis appeal in terms of 
describing a debate in which each side is struggling for advarl(age should nor however 
blind us (0 the rea1i(y thaI, as Collins says, contemporary employment law consisl.s of 
'an embcdded series of historic compromises and pragmafic solutions'. To a prac(ising 
lawyer involved on a day to day basis wil.h allempts to find a legal resolu(ion to (he 
issues facing employers and ernployees (or perhaps being used by Lhem as weapons ill 
an ongoing war) such sLark contrasts are rarely of assistance. An acceptance Ihat labour 
law is the producl of a variety or social, poliLica! and economic forces which ebb and 
flow in lhe ligtll of changing events, rarely reaching any fixed equilibrium. combined 
with an understanding of rhe differeru Forces at play is more likcly 10 assist in reaching 
a balanced solution acceptable in the long term ro all panics. See in this regard Creigh-
ton B. Ford and Mirchell R Labour law: Text and materials, 2 ed (1993). paras t .1-1 .5 
and l.:n-2.2S. 
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The concept of balance between the competing forces in the employ-
ment arena, in accordance with a. constitutional imperative (hat gave pro-
tection to fair labour practices, is in my view what was sought in the 
drafting of the LRA. In looking for that balance there was a recognition of 
the necessary blend between competing legal sources. The starting point 
inescapably was the nature of the employment relationship that should 
attract the application of the Act. Here the unequivocal choice of the LRA 
is that all employment relationships, other than those between an em-
ployer and an independent contractor (the locatio conductio operis of our 
common law), make a person an employee under the Ace In a sense this 
reversed the usual approach in prior legislation that started with the con-
tract of employment and was then interpreted to exclude independent 
contractors.- I It is arguable that the result may have been to expand slightly 
the concept of an employee for the purposes of the LRA but for my pur-
poses today the point is that the entire operation of the LRA is embedded 
in the common law, In order to answer the threshold question; 'To whom 
does the LRA apply?' one must resort to the common law. In the end 
South Africa accepted, as every other jurisdiction I have encountered has 
done, that the contract of employment is the key relationship to the appli-
cation of its labour relations legislation. ' 
This recognition that a contractual relationship lies at the heart of em~ 
ployment is not confined to the threshold issue of the application of the 
LRA. The controversial issue of the application of collective agreements in 
relation to the individual employee is tackled in sections 23 and 3 I of the 
LRA, read with section 199, which makes the terms of all such agree-
ments binding upon the members of the contracting parties, that is, the 
members of the trade union or unions and the employer members of any 
employer body that is party to the agreement, where the agreement 
21 ()(lk Indusmes (SA) (Pry) Ltd v}ohn NO 1987 (4) SA 702 (N) 706 D ·E; SA Dental Techm~ 
C/(jn~ Assf)(."wlion v Denwl k.s()cialion of '<"Ollih Africa I 'no (3) SA 7)3 (A) 74 J A F. The 
approach adopted in tile definition ot 'employee' is also consistent with decisions in lhf' 
old LAC sllch (lS Houma/ Lid Ii V(lllyhan (1992) I 3 /~J 934 (LAC) and Camdons Rea/ry (PlY) 
Ltd v ilar! (! 993) ! 4 I(J 934 (LAC). See also s 200A of the LHA 
22 lr is suggested thar if iHHI whe!l the CorlsliLU1JOnai Courc has lO grapple wirh (he concept 
of a 'worker" In seCtion 23 of tlH~ ConSritlHi()fl it will ve driv(!n lO accept litis reality. 
There i" nothing unUSUal about thIS althougll i( demonstrates rl1f' impossibility of the 
attempt ro excise la!Jour laW from Ihe embrace of tile COTTlmon law. I venture (0 suggest 
that Ki:lltn-rrclHld's 'figment or rl\(~ legal imagination' owed more to rhetoric than to fact 
and that his equally famolls descnption of [he comrau of ernployrnent as '[he corner-
stone of [he editice or labour law' WaS rather more aCUlraLe. As Mark Freedland points 
out in his recent magisterial work Personal i:"mploymenf Contract: 
'Enghsh law is deeply. perhaps irrevClc(lbly, cOrllflliL1ed (0 d contractual analysis ot (he 
clIlploymcrtL relationship', 
Similarly anOl!ter well-known English writer Stephen Anderman in Labour /t1w: Mt1nage-
menl deCisions and workers' rights 4 ed (2000) 36 wrote thaI 
a thorough understanding of (tle characteristics ot the conLracL of employment is d 
virtual precondition to all und<::rstanding of tlte subject of labour law'. 
See also Smith IT and Thomas (JH eds Smirh and Woods' industria/law 8 ed 100-1. 
where Lhey say Lhal 'The rorllract theory remains paramount' The law in other 
cOllnlries appears LO dccepL (he Safrit: starting point (llthOl1gtl wJlh apparently less need 
ror any traurnatic debate 
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regulates terms and conditions of employment or the conduct of employ~ 
ers towards employees and vice versa.2~ The agreements themselves are 
legally binding thereby dispelling any notion imported from the UK that 
they are not intended to be legally binding. In adopting this approach the 
LRA squarely accepts the role of contract in relation not only to the indi~ 
vidual employee but also in relation to the interaction between trade 
unions and employees. This is not to say that the contractual model may 
not generate problems. Of course it does. Take the simple case of a discip-
linary code that is made contractually binding in this way. Time and again 
CCMA arbitrators and the Labour Court are confronted with situations 
where in a last throw of the dice it is claimed that an entirely justifiable 
dismissal following upon an entirely fair hearing is nonetheless flawed 
because of non-compliance with some provision of the code that in no 
way affected the course of the proceedings. The argument is available 
because the contractual term is breached even though the breach is irrel-
evant to the outcome of the disciplinary process. It forces the adjudicator 
to grapple with concepts such as waiver and the consequences of breach 
which would not otherwise be relevant. 
The acceptance of the common law and its rules in these areas does not 
mean that it reigns supreme over our labour law or that the LRA is subor~ 
dinate to its dictates. In the field of unfair dismissal to which Chapter VIII 
applies it is clear that the requirement that dismissals must be for a fair 
reason and must be preceded by a fair procedure addresses an issue that 
the common law could not. Jt is easy then to say that the common law 
has been displaced and that we need only have reference (0 the sta(Ute, 
but is [his really so? I looked again at the sec(ion of a book dealing with 
the common law grounds for summary termination of a contract of em-
ployment)4 and found that it listed the following general categories of con-
duct that might at common law justify a person's summary dismissal: 
assault, insubordination, insolence, negligence and incompetence. dis~ 
honesty, intoxication and drug abuse. breach of the duty of good faith, 
absence from work and finally misconduct in terms of a disciplinary code. 
Few disciplinary codes would ignore the items in that list and arbitrators 
in the CCMA wrestle with them daily. It appears then that the common 
law was not perhaps entirely wide of the mark in identifying the grounds 
for terminating a contract of employment. 
I would suggest that a more Significant change in the law relating to dis-
missal relates to termination on notice. The old grounds for summary [er-
mination by and large remain open although the employer is now re-
quired to justify their invocation. which is a procedural rather than a sub-
stantive maHer. In many ways the requirements for retrenchment are also 
procedural matters rather than substantive as the labour courts have con-
sistently held that they are not in a position to second guess employers' 
2.3 The resull is similar to An L J 35··2 of [he French Code du Travail cited by Lord Wedder" 
burn in his J 993 Sinztleimer leCiure puhlished in Lord Wedderhurn ·Labour law and 
freedom' 102. 
24 Wallis, supra n I. para .35. See also (jrogan DismIssal Chapter 8 
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views on desirable staffing levels. It follows that if the proper procedures 
are followed the employer will ordinarily be able to retrench if it wishes to 
do so. However, the ability of the employer to resort to termination in a 
situation less extreme than summary dismissal has been substantially cur~ 
tailed. Genera! dissatisfaction with an employee, the fact that a person is a 
disruptive influence or has a personality clash with colleagues, below par 
work performance or doing just enough but no more, can no longer be 
dealt with by simply giving the employee nOlice and suggesting that they 
would be well advised to devote their undoubted talents to some other en~ 
terprise. This will not pass muster under the LRA. In effect all employment 
contracts have become indefinite from the side of the employer and sub~ 
ject only to termination for cause. The common law of summary dismissal 
is now the law of dismissal. 
The LRA also made a deliberate choice in favour of conciliation and 
arbitration as the preferred method of dispute resolution in most of the 
common situations where disputes can arise in relation to employment 
and particularly in relation to dismissals. In so doing it elected to use lan~ 
guage that it drew directly from laws governing arbitration.·' The effect is 
to import into this viral aspect of our labour law a body of common Jaw 
developed by the courts and embodied in legislation dealing in similar lan-
guage with ordinary commercial arbitrations.~~ This common law applies 
not only to [he question of reviewability of arbitrations under section 145 
but to the very manner in which they are conducted under section 138.
21 
Again, it is clear that in a fashion that is consistent with the entire de~ 
veJopment of South African law there is borrowing of what is useful in 
another area in order to meet the specific needs of labour law. This is en~ 
tirely consistent with a civil law system that tends to see the law as an en-
tire system rather rhan a series of discrete compartments with its constant 
consequent search for the appropriate pigeonhole for any given problem. 
The balancing act between the common law and a fair labour regime in 
which the importance of collective actlon is accepted and protected is 
maintained in chapter IV of the LRA in the provisions dealing with strikes 
and other forms of collective action. Section 67(6) is important in this 
regard. It prevents the institution of civil legal action against any person 
2S Allerniorl was drdwn to thJS in an address to tlte inaugural meeting or the SOllth Af"riCrlfl 
Society for Lobour L.-lW pllblished under the lille The new UtA - how deciSIVe Q break 
with (hi' pa:-,(?· ill (1997) 18 ILJ 902 
26 Ttle common law is sel OUI in Dickenson & Brown v Fisher's Executors 19 J.'J AD 166 at 
174~5. Much of the relevant low is collected ill my judgment in Shopnle Checkers (PlY) 
I.td v Rl1mdaw NO and o(hen; (2000) 21 ILJ J 232 (LC) and is not dealr with or challenged 
in tile subsequent decision of" tlte LAC. This is !lot rhe oLCosion on which to COlTlment 
on the latter judgmellt althOllgtt !IS correctm:ss is highly debatable 
27 Naraindath v CCMA and anolher (2000) 21 iLJ I 15 [ (LC)' Regrenably, proceedings before 
the CCMA Ilave become far [00 similar [0 the lirigation rnodel of courts for Ihe aims of 
arbitration as a sumlJ\ary and e.xpeditious means of resolvillg labour disputes [0 have 
been satisfauorily fiJI filled. III addilioll, the freedom with which arbitration awards can 
be choJlerrgel1 results in many cases dragging on endlessly [hereby crcoling the very 
problems that the LRA set OUl to ovoid. It has also burdene(j the Labour Coun witt] a 
workload that it continues to have difficLJlty coping wirh. 
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participating in a protected strike or lockout or any conduct in furtherance 
of such a strike or lockout. It seems to me Lhat this goes funher than the 
old system of immunities transplanted to South Africa from the English 
Trade Disputes Act of 1906. No civil action may be undertaken because 
the strike or lockout in question is protected or, in other words, lawful. 
Since unlawfulness is an essential component of any claim for damages 
under our law of delict the absence of unlawfulness will preclude such an 
action. Again there is a symhesis between the common law and what 
Justice Holmes referred to as 'the felt necessities of the time,.28 
One last thought before I close. We live in a constitutional state and 
much of our labour law is statutory. That means that it falls to be in-
terpreted by the couns but there are no special rules applicable lO labour 
legislation as opposed to any other form of legislation. The rules of statu-
tory interpretation are rules evolved by the courts in a gradual process 
over time. Even if we were able to isolate and codify all our labour law in 
statutes and eliminate any need to have resort to common law principles 
of contract and delict and arbitral process the embrace of the common 
law cannot be emirely avoided as its rules will determine the scope, ex-
tent and meaning of rights and obligations expressed elsewhere. There 
are many annoying things in life that we try to suppress only to have 
them pop up to surprise us somewhere else. Perhaps the time has come 
for us to stop trying to suppress the common law in the area of labour law 
and to accept that It is a part of life that needs regulation and adaptation 
but like death and taxes it is always with us. 
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